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CHILLED TO THE PILL:  THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY’S COOL
RECEPTION OF THE POISON PILL AND POTENTIAL
REPERCUSSIONS
Douglas G. Gruener*
INTRODUCTION
While the 1990s is frequently referred to as Japan’s “lost decade” because
of the nation’s economic underperformance and weak structures for corporate
governance,1 the past few years have shown a business environment that is in
the midst of significant transition.  Most importantly, Japan is experiencing
a boom in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), with the first half of 2005 alone
accounting for an aggregate value of $108.9 billion in Japanese M&A
transactions (greater than the $108.5 billion of deal value accumulated in all
of 2004).2  Among the major factors contributing to this trend are the
improved cash positions of many companies, a record level of foreign share
ownership that has helped strengthen shareholder activism, and, perhaps most
significantly, the gradual unwinding of stable cross-shareholding relationships
that were previously a staple of Japanese corporate strategy and stability.3
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The dissipation of cross-shareholdings is especially important because
these arrangements, in which companies would agree with certain business
partners or affiliated entities to purchase each other’s shares under a mutual
understanding that the shares would not be traded, were considered to be
conclusive of the fact that in Japan “the stock market has not been a viable
venue for contesting corporate control.”4  According to some estimates, there
were times when up to 70 percent of outstanding Japanese corporate equity
was held in these relationships,5 making it mathematically impossible for
change-of-control transactions to occur through the market.  However, the
composition of the market is much different today, and a recent report by the
Nissei Research Institute estimates that cross-shareholdings among
corporations and banks fell on a value basis from 18.5 percent in 1987 to 7.6
percent in 2003.6
Since cross-shareholdings were an integral part of the keiretsu7
relationships that enabled Japan to become an economic powerhouse in the
20th century,8 it is not surprising that their extinguishment has been slow and
not entirely voluntary.  Rather, stable shareholdings have dissipated “mainly
because the poor performance of the Japanese stock market in the past ten
years made shareholding relatively costly.”9  In addition, changes were made
to Japanese accounting principles that require companies to start recognizing
the fair value of their equity holdings in their financial statements and
impairment losses for certain deflated securities.10
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Under these circumstances, Japan is experiencing a market for corporate
control for the first time.11  Since the emergence of hostile takeovers in Japan
is essentially an outgrowth of the extended economic malaise that led to
incremental changes in the fundamental capital structures and business
methods of Japanese companies, it was not unforeseeable as of a few years
ago.  Thus, in 2002 the Japanese Commercial Code was amended to make
technically feasible another new feature of the corporate environment12—the
poison pill.13  The invention of famed takeover lawyer Martin Lipton, the pill
is clearly the most popular takeover defense in the United States, with recent
estimates that it is in effect at over 2,300 companies.14  The poison pill is a
particularly desirable defensive measure because its adoption involves no
significant outlay of cash or fundamental change to the capital structure of the
corporation.  In addition, rather than acting as a preclusive defense against
takeovers, the pill has been shown to provide target directors with valuable
time to evaluate and negotiate a tender offer and ultimately secure a high
premium in the event of a sale of control.15
While early news reports on the introduction of poison pills to Japan
indicated that the devices might be widely adopted as a replacement defense
for cross-shareholdings, the preliminary evidence points to a more limited and
gradual implementation.  At the June 2005 corporate shareholders’ meetings
in Japan, eight companies successfully received shareholder approval of their
poison pill plans.16  However, three others had proposals to increase
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authorized capital stock rejected by shareholders,17 which is significant
because “the number of shares issuable upon exercise of stock acquisition
rights may not exceed the number of authorized shares (which may not exceed
four times as many as the total number of issued shares).”18  More importantly
for those analyzing the pill in Japan from a legal perspective, two takeover
defenses were recently challenged before the Tokyo District Court and were
invalidated in both cases.19  Thus, shareholders and courts in Japan are not
embracing the poison pill warmly as of yet, and its prospects for becoming
widespread in the immediate future are not especially promising.
To some commentators, this treatment of the poison pill in Japan may be
considered laudable, as it has been convincingly argued that hostile takeovers
will play an important role in efficiently reallocating assets in the Japanese
economy.20  However, this Note explores the possibility that this cool
reception of the pill may be relatively short-lived, and even harmful, in Japan.
Part I of this Note lays out the pieces of Japan’s current legal approach to
poison pill issuances, relying on government guidelines and the prominent
decisions in the Livedoor and Nireco cases.  Part II uses those sources to
attempt to formulate the overall direction of the doctrine and assess what
features a poison pill likely must possess to be successfully adopted.  I argue
that although the Japanese doctrine is in alignment with Delaware takeover
jurisprudence on several counts, Japan has moved Delaware’s standard ex post
analysis of takeover defenses to an ex ante position and, in doing so, has
created a standard that is inherently difficult to overcome.  In addition, the
Japanese judiciary has strongly implied that in order for Japanese directors to
withstand a challenge to the validity of a poison pill, they must relinquish all
decision-making authority over whether a pill should be redeemed.  For these
reasons, I argue that many companies in Japan will either decline to include
the poison pill as a defense mechanism or have their pills overturned by
shareholder challenge.
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Part III argues that in consideration of the significantly improved
environment for shareholder activism in Japan, these judicial limitations on
the pill may be unnecessary.  I explore potential effects of the current doctrine,
including a possible legislative intervention that would effectively overrule the
judiciary’s decisions by making the poison pill or other defenses easier to
adopt.  If such legislation appears, it can only be hoped that it does not go too
far in providing companies with preclusive tools for defense.  Until or unless
there is a legislative intervention, I also argue that current economic
conditions mean there is a possibility that some companies will return to
cross-shareholding as a takeover defense upon realizing the various
difficulties involved in adopting a poison pill.  Since poison pills have the
potential to allow target directors to secure high premiums on behalf of
shareholders and do not involve the fundamental capital structure changes that
are necessary for cross-shareholding, this would be a regrettable development.
This Note concludes that in order to avoid scenarios where Japanese
companies have an incentive to revert to cross-shareholding and to make a
potentially imbalanced legislative intervention less likely to occur, the
Japanese judiciary should reconsider its current doctrinal direction to make
poison pills easier to adopt in the face of shareholder challenges.
I.  TOOLS FOR EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF POISON PILLS IN JAPAN
A.  Government Guidelines Regarding Takeover Defenses
In May 2005, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) jointly issued guidelines regarding takeover
defenses “with the goal of preventing excessive defensive measures,
enhancing the reasonableness of takeover defense measures and thereby
promoting the establishment of fair rules governing corporate takeovers in the
business community”21 (hereinafter referred to as “Ministry Guidelines” or
“Guidelines”).  While the Ministry Guidelines are not legally binding,22 their
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message clearly impacted (or alternatively, was impacted by) the court
decisions discussed later in this Note, and thus the Guidelines should not be
taken lightly.23  Judicial reference to the Guidelines is perhaps inevitable, as
other sources of guidance regarding the legal standards for takeover defenses
remain sparse in Japan.24
The Ministry Guidelines established three broad principles for the
development of takeover defenses in Japan:  (1) the use of takeover defenses
should be undertaken with the goal of protecting and enhancing corporate
value and shareholders’ common interests; (2) when defenses are adopted,
their purpose and terms should be disclosed and should reflect the will of
shareholders; and (3) the takeover defense measures in response to a possible
takeover threat must be necessary and reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.25  The Guidelines explain each of these principles in some detail, but
only the central highlights will be covered for the purposes of this Note.
For the first principle, the Guidelines list several situations in which the
adoption of defensive measures would clearly be undertaken for the protection
of shareholders.  These situations include takeover threats that would damage
shareholders’ interests because of the bidder’s intentions (such as where the
bidder is a greenmailer or intends to sell off the company’s assets), coercive
two-tiered takeovers, or simply where there is not adequate time to fully
consider a bidder’s offer or explore the possibility of superior alternatives.26
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Under the second principle, the Guidelines heavily imply that the easiest
way for directors to demonstrate that a defensive measure reflects the will of
shareholders is to gain shareholders’ approval at a general meeting following
a full disclosure of the measure’s purpose, term, and effects.  “When stock
acquisition rights, etc. are issued as a takeover defense measure based on
approval at the general meeting of stockholders . . . there is a high probability
that such measures will be considered in compliance with the three principles
of the Guidelines, and thus constitute a fair issuance.”27  Conversely, where
the takeover defense is based on a resolution of the board of directors without
receiving shareholder approval, satisfaction of the second principle makes it
“necessary to provide a mechanism to allow shareholders to cause the
termination of such rights based on the general consensus of the
shareholders.”28
To meet the third principle of necessity and reasonableness, the
Guidelines state that due consideration should be given to principles of
shareholder equality, protection of property rights, and the prevention of the
abuse of defensive measures to achieve management entrenchment.29  The
Guidelines again indicate that it is desirable if the shareholders have a
mechanism to remove the defensive measures30 and also state that defensive
measures must not create financial losses for the shareholders (other than the
acquiring entity).31  Finally, the Guidelines suggest the establishment of
objective criteria that would cause a defensive measure to terminate
automatically after a period of evaluation and negotiation regarding a
qualifying offer,32 and additionally endorse the use of “independent outsiders”
to evaluate takeover offers.33
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B.  The Case of Livedoor
In February 2005, Takafumi Horie, the thirty-two-year-old founder and
president of the Internet company Livedoor, sparked the biggest Japanese
business story of the year by announcing that his company had acquired 35
percent of the radio company Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (NBS) in
after-hours stock trading.34  Livedoor was able to consummate the large
purchase by utilizing a rather gaping loophole in Japan’s Securities and
Exchange Act, which only required a takeover bid for one-third or more of a
company’s shares to be publicly disclosed and open to all shareholders if it
were attempted outside the stock exchange.35  Horie openly communicated
that the true intention of the purchase was to gain control of Fuji Television
Network, Inc. (Fuji TV), a leading broadcast company in which NBS owned
a 22.5 percent stake.36  At the time of Livedoor’s purchase, Fuji TV had
already made a premium tender offer for all shares of NBS in an effort to
rectify their distorted cross-shareholding relationship within the Fuji Sankei
media group.37  The distortion stemmed from the fact that despite Fuji TV’s
$5.55 billion market capitalization being more than double that of NBS, NBS
held a 22.5 percent stake in Fuji TV while Fuji TV only held 12.4 percent of
the stock of NBS.38
With the stage set for a battle between Horie, “a young college dropout
in T-shirt and jeans,” and the “starched-shirted sixty-somethings” managing
the Fuji Sankei group entities, Livedoor’s takeover attempt captured
unprecedented media attention in Japan.39  While Livedoor continued to
purchase NBS shares in the weeks following the initial announcement, NBS
quickly moved to block Livedoor’s quest for total control by issuing warrants
(shin kabu yoyaku ken) to Fuji TV exercisable into 47.2 million shares of
NBS stock, a move authorized by the 2002 amendments to the Commercial
Code.40  Soon thereafter, Livedoor applied for an injunction against the
issuance of warrants in the Tokyo District Court, which ruled in Livedoor’s
favor on March 11, 2005 and granted the injunction.41  The decision was
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affirmed by the Tokyo High Court on March 23, 2005.42  This result was
perhaps unsurprising under the precedent of Shuwa v. Chujitsuya,43 as it was
clear that there was no capital-raising justification for the warrants, and the
exercise of the warrants would have increased NBS’s share capital by 140
percent44 and severely diluted the ownership stake of all shareholders other
than Fuji TV (not just the hostile bidder).  In the sense that the warrants were
not issued on a pro rata basis to all shareholders other than the hostile bidder,
Livedoor is not a true case of the poison pill.
Nevertheless, the precedent is significant to the analysis of poison pills
because in its opinion, the High Court chose to enumerate situations in which
the issuance of dilutive warrants in the midst of a hostile bid would be
justified:  (1) cases of greenmail in which the bidder intends to make the target
company repurchase the shares at a premium, (2) “scorched earth” situations
where the bidder intends to transfer the company’s intellectual property to the
bidder or its affiliates, (3) where the bidder’s intention is to acquire control in
order to use the target’s assets to secure or pay the bidder’s debts, and
(4) situations where the bidder intends to sell off assets not related to the core
business in order to pay a one-time dividend.45  The common theme of the list
is the likelihood of exploitation by the bidder and consequent detriment to
shareholders.
The Livedoor saga is also a significant point of analysis because the
defense that NBS and Fuji TV attempted to raise was not limited to the
issuance of warrants.  Following the District Court’s injunction of the
warrants, NBS threatened to sell its 56 percent stake in Pony Canyon (a highly
successful music and video publishing company) if the Livedoor bid looked
likely to succeed46—a classic crown jewel defense.  Around the same time,
Fuji TV announced that it would double its dividend payouts as compared
with 2004, which was seen as a maneuver to boost its share price and make it
more difficult for Livedoor to try a full takeover.47  Soon thereafter, Fuji TV
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filed an application to issue up to $474 million in new shares in hopes of
making a takeover even more difficult.48  Finally, after the District Court’s
decision was affirmed and it became apparent that the issuance of share
warrants would not be possible, Softbank Investment (SBI) emerged as a
white knight and “borrowed” a 13.88 percent stake in Fuji TV from NBS,
replacing NBS as Fuji TV’s largest shareholder.49  As a result, Livedoor’s gain
of control over NBS no longer meant that the corollary of control over Fuji
TV would exist, and Horie had little choice but to seek a truce with Fuji TV.
As part of the agreement the parties reached, Livedoor sold its entire stake in
NBS to Fuji TV at a slight profit, and in return Fuji TV invested around $440
million in Livedoor and agreed to establish a business alliance.50  If nothing
else, this story demonstrates that despite Japanese companies’ lack of direct
experience with hostile takeovers, they are certainly not unskilled at creating
and implementing a variety of strategic defenses.
C.  The Case of Nireco
Japan’s first true poison pill case arose earlier this year when SFP Value
Realization Fund Ltd. of the Cayman Islands challenged the shareholder rights
plan of Nireco, a manufacturer of high-tech measuring devices and controllers.
Nireco’s “security plan,” announced at a board meeting on March 14, 2005,
provided that all registered shareholders as of March 31, 2005 would receive
two equity warrants for each share they owned (for free); each warrant in turn
would provide the right to buy one new share of stock for one yen upon the
occurrence of a triggering event.51  The triggering event was defined as the
acquisition of 20 percent or more of the company by any single entity, and the
period for exercise of the warrants was determined to be from June 16, 2005
to June 16, 2008.52  The plan declared that the warrants would only be
exercisable by shareholders who received them directly from the company as
a result of being a registered shareholder on March 31, 2005, and that the
warrants were not transferable thereafter.53  At the time of the announcement,
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SFP was the owner of 2.85 percent of Nireco’s stock.54  Nireco’s directors did
not pursue shareholder approval for the plan, but listed the following
justifications for the poison pill:  stable shareholdings had declined such that
thirteen percent of the company was being held by pure investment funds, the
company’s price-to-book-value ratio was well under one, the company
possessed high cash assets, and in 2004 the company had been listed by a
prominent economics newspaper as being the seventy-first most likely
company in Japan to be acquired by a tender offer.55  Nireco declared that the
purpose of the plan was to prevent a harmful takeover in advance and to
maximize the company’s value.56
At the time of the plan’s adoption, the directors also had defined the
conditions for redemption.  The decision about whether to redeem the pill
would focus on the maximization of company value, the effect of the takeover
bid on minority shareholders, and the opinion of a special three-member
committee that was to be fully respected.57  Perhaps sensing that the final
aspect could be significant to the court’s decision, the board actually changed
the composition of the special committee after SFP had filed its lawsuit to
achieve a greater degree of independence.  While the original committee
consisted of a company executive, a lawyer, and a professor, as of May 20,
2005, the committee was changed to two lawyers and a professor, and its
opinion would be fully respected and followed unless there was an exceptional
case where it became clear that the takeover would damage the company’s
value.58  In addition to this change, Nireco’s board clarified the methods and
timing of its disclosure that a triggering event had occurred and declared that
any further changes to the rights plan would require unanimous approval of
the special committee and immediate disclosure.59  Finally, Nireco’s May 20,
2005 alterations to its rights plan included a direct reference to the Livedoor
decision.  Specifically, the board announced that a decision not to redeem the
poison pill would generally be found in the four situations listed by the
Livedoor court60 and in other cases where the directors find a risk of damage
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automatically to all outstanding shares.  See Leonard Loventhal Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No.
Civ.A.17803, 2000 WL 1528909 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2000).
66. SFP Value Realization Fund Ltd. v. Nireco K.K. (Tokyo D. Ct., June 1, 2005), at 6, available
at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/kshanrei.nsf/webview/88299A542BDC7FA649257015000CEE97/
?OpenDocument (in Japanese).
67. Id. at 7.
to company stakeholders.61  In the final scenario, the board would bear the
burden of proving the risk of damage.62
Despite these improvements to the rights plan, on June 1 the Tokyo
District Court granted the injunction that SFP was seeking, and the decision
was affirmed by the Tokyo High Court on June 15.63  Although SFP argued
that the rights plan violated several sections of the Commercial Code, the
District Court only agreed that there had been a violation of the Commercial
Code’s prohibition on “significantly unfair” issuances.64  The District Court
pointed out a rather obvious defect of the Nireco poison pill—because only
the registered shareholders as of March 31, 2005 received the warrants, and
because those warrants were declared nontransferable by the board,65 anyone
investing after the point in time at which it was possible to appear on the
March 31 register and thereby receive the warrants (thought to be a March 27
purchase date) would face a severe risk of dilution from the possibility of the
pill being activated and not redeemed.66  As a result of these circumstances,
rational investors would place a lower value on Nireco shares starting on
March 28, and a depression of the stock price to the detriment of all
shareholders would be expected.67
While the decision to suspend Nireco’s poison pill could surely have been
based on this flaw alone, the District Court went further by stating that “in the
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68. Id. at 10 (translation by the author).
69. Id. at 10.  Readers of this Note may recognize the somewhat contradictory message of this
section of the opinion.  While the court talks of the possibility of directors adopting a pill “in advance”
(presumed to mean during “peacetime,” when there is no specific cognizable threat), the situation cited as
an example of when this is possible implies that it can only be done to ward off a threat of incurable
damage.  While the District Court’s actual intent is unclear, one could interpret this section to mean that
companies have little or no freedom to adopt a pill when their identifiable objective is to utilize its power
to assist in the evaluation and negotiation of a future tender offer.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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adoption of a defensive measure in advance, such as the stock acquisition
rights in [Nireco’s] case, it is a general rule that it should be carried out based
on the will of a general shareholders’ meeting. . . .”68  However, in recognition
of the fact that, in the period between shareholders’ meetings, it is possible for
a takeover threat to appear that would cause incurable damage to the target
company, the District Court recognized that directors can adopt advance
takeover defenses without shareholder approval if their plans consider three
conditions.69
First, there should be a mechanism to reflect the shareholders’ opinion,
such as giving shareholders the authority to decide whether or not to redeem
a poison pill based on their own judgment.70  Second, there should be a
structure to prevent the board of directors from making an arbitrary decision
not to redeem a poison pill.71  To ensure that decisions against redemption
only occur in situations where the hostile bidder would cause incurable
damage to the company, there might be objective conditions set regarding the
redemption decision or independent outsiders might be given the authority to
decide.72  Third, the adoption of a poison pill should not cause unexpected
damage to the shareholders unrelated to the takeover.73
Despite the lack of necessity to the actual holding of the case, the District
Court explained in dicta its reasoning for why Nireco’s rights plan did not
meet any of these conditions.  Regarding the first condition, although the
District Court recognized the possibility of a proxy contest in the future to
replace the board and reflect the shareholders’ desire to redeem the pill, the
fact that no election was scheduled for the June 2005 shareholders meeting
was considered significant.74  In addition, the planned agenda for this meeting
did not include discussion of how the shareholders’ opinion might be reflected
in the redemption decision.75
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77. Id. at 13-14.
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With regard to the second condition, the District Court held that Nireco’s
plan was not adequate despite the board of directors’ aforementioned
concession to five particular situations in which no redemption of the pill
would be offered and its agreement that the guidelines would not be changed
without unanimous approval of the special committee.  The District Court
made its decision regarding this condition on two bases:  (1) the fifth listed
situation (the only one not endorsed by the Livedoor opinion), in which the
board could elect not to redeem a pill based on damage to the company’s
stakeholders, was considered to be too broad and unclear to prevent an
arbitrary decision, and (2) for any redemption decision, although the board
agreed to “fully respect” the opinion expressed by the special committee, the
board reserved the right to make a decision contrary to the committee if it
considered there to be danger to corporate value.76  Thus, by not completely
relinquishing its authority over the redemption decision, the Nireco board
failed the second condition of the District Court.  This was in spite of the fact
that the board had agreed to assume the burden of proof in cases where it
claimed that a particular takeover offer would damage the company’s
stakeholders contrary to the opinion of the special committee.
For the third condition, the court’s analysis was rather easy because the
structure of Nireco’s share warrants as only being issued to registered
shareholders as of a particular date and the prohibition on the transfer of those
warrants after their issuance had the obvious effect of making Nireco stock
less attractive to investors.77  This structure created severe risks because the
acquisition rights could not be purchased along with the stock and, as a result,
even shareholders who received the warrants would face selling their shares
at a depressed price.78  Thus, the risk of damage was obvious in the Nireco
decision.
Near the end of its opinion, the District Court mentioned that Nireco
might have reached its purpose in using this defensive measure if the first or
third condition had been met.79  This comment somewhat skews the analysis
appearing earlier in the opinion and implies that the three conditions are not
a conjunctive test for the future, but rather are guidelines to be considered and
satisfied if a poison pill issuance is to be upheld as legal.  Nevertheless, the
list of conditions remains a valuable initial precedent for Japan because where
2006] A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF JAPAN’S POISON PILL DOCTRINE 885
80. See METI & MOJ, supra note 21, at 4-5; Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2193-94.
81. During a discussion of the Livedoor saga on a popular Japanese television show, one guest used
a racial epithet to describe president Takafumi Horie’s business practices.  See David Pilling & Michiyo
Nakamoto, Japan’s Old Guard Gang up to Fight Young Pretender, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at 18.  A
former bureaucrat described Horie as a modern-day greenmailer, stating “[h]e is in it for the money.”
Nakamoto, Changing Channels, supra note 44.
82. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
any one of the three conditions is not met, it becomes likely that the takeover
defense in question will be invalidated upon challenge.
II.  ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE
As it currently stands, the Japanese doctrinal direction for evaluating
poison pills might be divided into three areas.  (For the purpose of this
assessment, the Ministry Guidelines are also considered despite being non-
binding.)  First, it is evident that a target board’s freedom in choosing to adopt
a poison pill is dependent on the nature of the threat being posed to the
company.  In the event that a bidder appears who is likely to commit
greenmail or other abusive strategies that would damage the target’s
shareholders, the Ministry Guidelines and Livedoor decision indicate that a
board would be justified in taking a defensive measure even if it were dilutive
to current shareholders.80  While the crucial question at the opposite end of the
spectrum remains unanswered, namely what freedom the target board enjoys
during a time with no specific cognizable threat, it seems unlikely that Japan
is willing to provide directors with great leeway in adopting pills during
“peacetime.”  This prediction is an extrapolation of the Livedoor decision,
where despite Livedoor’s unsolicited (and in the view of some,
underhanded81) acquisition of NBS shares, the court gave little consideration
to the possibility that NBS’s board had accurately perceived a threat to
shareholder value.  Rather, in part because there was no specific reason to
anticipate that Livedoor held abusive intentions for its acquisition of NBS, the
judiciary struck down NBS’s defensive measure.  In addition, despite Nireco’s
multiple arguments for why it was in danger of being a takeover target and
needed an advance defensive measure, the opinion in Nireco gives the sense
that the Tokyo District Court will not be persuaded by arguments regarding
undervaluation and high cash assets.  Furthermore, although the Nireco
decision purportedly left open the possibility of directors adopting advance
defenses, the District Court’s opinion is somewhat contradictory by referring
to a threat of incurable damage within the same discussion.82  Thus, when a
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83. See Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2195-97 (specifically discussing how the CVSG report, upon
which the Ministry Guidelines were in part based, bears a striking resemblance to Delaware jurisprudence).
company adopts a defensive measure during “peacetime” and the measure is
challenged, it seems very likely that the absence of a specific cognizable threat
would weigh towards the measure being struck down by the judiciary.  In this
way, the current doctrine may develop such that peacetime pills rarely survive
a challenge by shareholders.
Second, the pill needs to be structured so that it is likely to benefit
shareholders.  As the Nireco decision made apparent, when the structure of a
pill makes it likely that share prices will be depressed and shareholder value
will be harmed, there is very little question that a challenge to the pill will be
successful.  Thus, directors must take care to assure that the only party harmed
by a poison pill is the hostile bidder to whom the defense is directed.  To
improve the likelihood that a pill will benefit shareholders, directors might
also fully entrust shareholders with the decision of whether to redeem a pill
after a tender offer has been announced.  In this way, shareholders retain the
ultimate decision of to whom and at what price they sell their shares.  In
addition, directors can consider making their pills “chewable” such that if a
particular offer meets predetermined objective criteria, the pill terminates
automatically.
Finally, the poison pill must possess characteristics that make it unlikely
that it can be used simply for management entrenchment.  This criterion can
most directly be met by the board giving authority over the redemption
decision to a committee of independent outsiders.  As the Nireco decision
strongly implies, it is probably necessary for the directors to provide the
independent committee with complete authority over the decision because any
retention of decision-making power by the board will be viewed with
suspicion by the judiciary.  In addition, although the judiciary has not
specifically referred to the concept yet, it is likely that the Ministry
Guidelines’ requirement that a defense be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed will eventually factor into this evaluation.  Poison pills that are entirely
preclusive of hostile takeovers, perhaps by being combined with other
measures, are likely to be viewed as impermissible, while those allowing a
target board to have the time and leverage to negotiate for a higher bid will be
more likely to receive approval.
Of course, American corporate lawyers reading the above assessment will
undoubtedly recognize that Japan has borrowed some of its doctrine from
Delaware jurisprudence.83  The concepts of maximizing shareholder value,
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84. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“In the board’s
exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis begins with the basic principle that
corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”);
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he directors must show that the
defensive mechanism was ‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed.’  Moreover, that proof is materially
enhanced, as we noted in Unocal, where, as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted
of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.” (citation
omitted)).
85. See Vlahakis, supra note 14, at 1331 (stating that “[t]here is currently no doubt as to the legality
of rights plans. . . . Therefore, almost all litigation concerning rights plans now focuses on whether or not
a board should be required to redeem the rights in response to a particular bid.”).
86. William B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan:  A Judicial Perspective,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 45, 54 (stating that “in the Unocal decision, the Delaware Supreme Court . . .
announced that such defensive actions would be reviewed under enhanced judicial scrutiny—an objective
ex post review by the court to assess whether a board’s use of a particular defensive measure was
‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed.’”  (emphasis added)).
87. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2209.
relying on disinterested parties to make the redemption decision, and
structuring a pill so that it is reasonable in relation to the threat posed are all
cornerstones of Delaware’s takeover defense review.84  However, in Japan’s
adaptation of Delaware jurisprudence to suit its own circumstances, it has
established a subtle, yet crucial difference from Delaware:  while Delaware
courts apply their takeover review standards at the stage when a challenge is
made to the directors’ decision not to terminate a particular defense measure,85
Japan is moving toward application of similar standards at a stage when
directors are merely attempting to adopt a defense.  In other words, Delaware
review of takeover defenses can be characterized as ex post,86 while Japanese
courts are setting precedents for an ex ante analysis of poison pills and other
defenses.
Although the decisions made by the Japanese judiciary thus far in
Livedoor and Nireco were clearly correct based on obvious flaws in the
respective defenses, one must wonder whether the application of Delaware
standards from an ex ante position might create a hurdle that is simply too
high for even well-intentioned companies to overcome when their poison pills
are challenged.  Since “Delaware takeover jurisprudence, consisting of loosely
defined, fact-intensive standards, is indeterminate even on home soil,”87 this
outcome appears very possible where a judiciary attempts to establish an ex
ante review using standards similar to Delaware.  This is simply because at the
stage of adoption, there is an utter lack of facts and evidence for courts to
examine in coming to a decision.  Rather, to a much greater extent than the
Delaware judiciary faces in its ex post review, the Japanese courts and the
parties to the lawsuit will essentially have to guess as to what the directors
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90. In fact, Delaware companies are free to adopt poison pills by board resolution without showing
a specific threat of any kind.  This is because Delaware recognizes three general theories of threats that arise
in the takeover context:  (1) opportunity loss, where a hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of the
opportunity to select a superior alternative offer; (2) structural coercion, where the risk of disparate
treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholder decision-making; and (3) substantive
coercion, where the shareholders may mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they do not believe
management’s assertion that the company’s actual value is greater.  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.,
651 A.2d 1361, 1384-88 (Del. 1995).
intend by the defense or whether it is designed to protect shareholder value.
For example, if the Nireco case had to be decided without an obvious flaw in
the technical structure of the pill, what would the court actually have based its
decision upon?  If the pill would have been struck down simply because the
board did not relinquish every fiber of its power regarding the redemption
decision, that is a harsh precedent that is frankly insulting to the directors
whose duty it is to protect the company and its shareholders.  If the decision
would necessarily have depended on something else, perhaps a suspicion of
the court that the particular directors would act in their own self-interest, then
the Japanese courts may have stumbled across something that is not so much
a legal evaluation as it is a forum for incredulity.
While the idea has been proffered that Japan selected features of
Delaware jurisprudence not necessarily for their intellectual superiority to the
alternatives but rather for their “elastic quality,”88 it remains to be seen
whether the standards are so flexible that their application in an ex ante
context can be effective.  The goal in developing a doctrine to review takeover
defenses should be to never allow tactics motivated by management self-
interest, to always allow tactics motivated by an effort to secure the best price
for shareholders, and to carefully review tactics that are motivated by a claim
that more time is needed to evaluate an offer so that self-interest is not the
actual force at play.89  Since an ex ante application of Delaware standards
involves considerable guesswork, it is questionable whether these goals can
be met with Japan’s doctrinal direction.  Furthermore, ex ante review of
poison pills may inherently be weighted towards rejection of the pill, since it
makes establishing a threat more difficult than in Delaware90 and simply does
not provide directors with the opportunity to demonstrate that they utilized a
defensive measure for the company’s benefit in actual practice.  By forcing
directors to justify their pill’s characteristics at adoption rather than allowing
them to show how a pill benefited shareholders upon the occurrence of a
tender offer, Japan’s jurisprudence may be viewed as something of a
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91. Atsuhiko Jingu, Shihon Seisaku no Saikin no Doukou—Saikin no Baishuu Boueisaku no
Doukou [The Recent Trends in Capital Policies—Recent Takeover Defense Trends] (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.azsa.or.jp/b_info/ipo/200508/ipo_200508_01.html (in Japanese).
92. eAccess to adopt eAccess Rights Plan, May 12, 2005, at 1, available at http://
www.eaccess.net/press_img/2710_pdf.pdf.
93. Id. at 3.  This ingenious arrangement has also been proposed by the firm of Mori Hamada &
Matsumoto.  See Kawai, supra note 24, at 16-18.  For more information on the problem of ensuring that
stock and rights are held together, see supra note 65.
94. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2186-87.
preemptive strike against poison pills.  If poison pills are not given a
reasonable opportunity to be adopted in spite of challenges by shareholders,
then the issue of judicially separating pills that benefit shareholders from
those that entrench management becomes moot.
A counterargument to this assessment is that it remains entirely possible
for a Japanese company to adopt a poison pill or other defensive measure by
receiving shareholders’ approval at a general meeting.  As mentioned, eight
companies successfully gained the approval of their poison pills by
shareholders in June 2005.  However, it is interesting to note that several of
these pills were structured such that, even if they had been adopted without
shareholder approval, they would likely have passed muster under a judicial
challenge.  For example, the rights plans approved by the shareholders of
Seino Transportation Co., Pentax Corp., and eAccess Ltd. all contained a
mechanism to reflect the shareholders’ will and avoided the risk of unforeseen
damage to shareholders other than the hostile bidder.91  In the case of eAccess,
it protected its shareholders by placing the redemption decision in the hands
of the company’s independent directors and by providing a sunset provision
requiring that the plan be approved by shareholders every three years if it is
to continue.92  In addition, eAccess utilized a trust arrangement to avoid the
problem under the Commercial Code of ensuring that stock and stock
acquisition rights are held together.93
This potential convergence between the characteristics of pills that are
adopted by board resolution and those adopted via shareholder approval
means that directors’ aversion to relinquishing their duty of setting corporate
policy perhaps cannot be avoided through either method of adoption.  In
addition, one should not assume that the eAccess type of arrangement would
be palatable, or even possible, for most Japanese companies because about
three-fourths of the companies still have board structures that do not include
independent outside directors.94  For the majority of companies, the only
methods available to satisfy considerations of shareholders’ will and the
prevention of arbitrary decisions might be to grant power over the redemption
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95. This was the phrase used by the Director of METI’s Industrial Organization Division to describe
the Ministry Guidelines during a 2005 interview.  See Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO Spotlight
Interview:  Satoshi Kusakabe (2005), http://www.jetro.org/content/263.  Clearly, the court decisions
discussed in this Note have moved even closer to what is being perceived as a “shareholder friendly”
doctrine.
96. Gilson, supra note 20, at 33-40.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2185.
decision directly to shareholders or to complete outsiders.  This clearly will
not be acceptable to many Japanese directors, nor should it be.  As a result, it
seems possible that the current doctrine will lead to relatively limited usage
of the poison pill in Japan as compared to the United States, whether gaining
shareholder approval is plausible or not.
III.  POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE
Among some commentators, Japan’s “shareholder friendly”95 approach
to the pill will undoubtedly be met with praise.  Although even the most vocal
critics of the poison pill in the United States will admit that it has more often
worked to improve the target board’s negotiating position for a higher price
than it has to entrench self-interested management, this is of course a result of
the pill being vigorously policed in the United States by independent directors,
courts, and investors rather than the inherent design of the pill itself.96
Because it has been argued that the forces of independent directors and
investors in Japan are comparatively weak,97 it will be seen as natural and
laudable by some observers that Japanese courts have come down harshly on
the pill to compensate for the dearth of other mitigating factors and to avoid
the pill’s potential detriments.
However, recent displays of shareholder activism and the composition of
the current market in Japan cause one to hesitate in blindly accepting the
position that investors cannot play an effective policing role for Japanese
poison pills.  Japanese investors have recently shown signs that they are
indeed capable, as at the June 2005 shareholders’ meetings they contributed
to successful votes against three companies’ attempts to increase the amount
of authorized capital stock, and “several [Japanese] public retirement plan
sponsors collectively managing over $1 trillion in assets have recently
established proxy voting guidelines that emphasize corporate governance
considerations.”98  Furthermore, as of March 31, 2005, foreign ownership of
Japanese stocks was at a record 23.7 percent of publicly traded shares (worth
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99. John Brinsley, Poison Pill Defenses Take Spotlight in Japan, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 21,
2005, http://iht.com/articles/2005/06/20/bloomberg/sxtakeover.php.
100. David Turner, Foreigners Buy into Japan’s Recovery, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1.
101. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2184.
102. David Ibison, Asahi Accused of Shareholder Rights Abuses, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at 28.
103. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2186-87.
104. It should be noted that this protectionist view is certainly not unique to Japan.  For example, in
2005 the United States Congress effectively blocked a Chinese company’s attempt to take over energy
company Unocal.  See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘Congressional Angst’ Scuppers Chinese Bid, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2005, at 22.
105. Michiyo Nakamoto, Livedoor Seeks Court Injunction to Block NBS, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005,
at 29.
106. Michiyo Nakamoto, Livedoor Bid Puts Focus on MPOs, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at 30.
a total of $840 billion),99 and as of November 18, 2005, foreign investors had
made net purchases of $78.9 billion worth of Japanese shares during the 2005
calendar year.100  Much of this foreign purchasing is being done by the same
institutional investors that effectively police corporate decision-making in the
United States, such as CalPERS.101  The Nireco case itself demonstrates how
a foreign plaintiff can successfully influence Japanese corporate governance,
and more recently U.S.-based Liberty Square Asset Management took the
activist lead against Asahi Broadcasting’s proposal to protect itself by issuing
new shares to its affiliated companies.102
The increasing strength of shareholders’ voices in Japan, coupled with the
likelihood that the number of companies including independent directors on
their boards is expected to increase,103 is perhaps further evidence that the
doctrinal direction of the Japanese judiciary will prove to be too strict in
limiting poison pills’ ability to survive challenge.  If Japanese companies
struggle in defending themselves from takeovers in relation to this point, it is
foreseeable that the Japanese Diet (legislature) might pass legislation that
intervenes and makes poison pills and other takeover defenses easier to adopt
for Japanese companies.  This is especially possible because, despite the fact
that the majority of recent hostile activity in Japan has been carried out by
Japanese companies, there is an underlying fear of foreign takeovers that has
resulted in a theme of nationalist protectionism in political and bureaucratic
discussions of takeovers.104  For example, a storyline of the Livedoor saga was
that in order to finance its NBS bid, Livedoor issued $759 million of
convertible bonds to Lehman Brothers, the U.S. investment bank.105  As fear
arose that Lehman Brothers would indirectly gain control of NBS and Fuji TV
after converting its bonds to Livedoor stock, “Lehman was forced to issue a
statement saying it had no intention of controlling Livedoor or entering the
Japanese media industry.”106  More recently, with regard to Japan’s new
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112. In the wake of the Nireco decision, a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was quoted
as saying “[j]udges don’t know what exactly is going on at businesses.  You can never be sure how far you
can trust their judgment.”  Poison Pill Guides Fail to Quell Anxiety, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 24, 2005,
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200506240155.html (on file with the author).  While
Company Law that is to take effect in April 2006, MOJ began considering a
potential change that would have completely reversed the government’s
proposal of making all-stock mergers possible and thus encouraging foreign
acquisition activity in Japan (a proposal that was already set to be delayed
from its original initiation date until 2007).107  Specifically, the new rules
would have forced a foreign company conducting a share-for-share exchange
to secure a “super extraordinary resolution” from the target group’s
shareholders (considered to be nearly impossible) and to obtain a secondary
listing in Japan.108  Although MOJ postponed the change after being warned
by METI that the proposal was not consistent with the nation’s goals for
foreign direct investment, it remains possible that the restrictions will
eventually take effect.109  Since share-for-share transactions are typically
friendly, it is not unthinkable that even more severe regulations might
sometime be proposed for the purpose of preventing hostile takeovers.  One
such regulation might include an easing of the requirements for Japanese
companies to adopt poison pills.
Ironically, it was the predecessor organization of METI (coauthor of the
Guidelines discussed earlier), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), that was instrumental in the proliferation of cross-shareholding
relationships in the 1970s that long served to protect companies from
takeovers.  For example, it is well known that MITI Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
played a direct role in directing and facilitating the establishment of cross-
shareholdings when General Motors announced in 1969 that it was
considering a large purchase of Isuzu Motors.110  The result was that General
Motors was only permitted to buy thirty-five percent of the company, and only
so long as the remainder of Isuzu shares was held by stable entities.111  While
the modern-day METI certainly appears more open to takeovers than its
predecessor, another ministry or even politicians themselves may initiate an
amendment to the Commercial Code to counteract the high hurdles that have
been foreshadowed for challenged poison pills thus far by the Japanese
judiciary.112
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MOJ was not only the ministry that recently took the lead in the reversal of positions regarding all-stock
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grounds.  There isn’t any precedent showing they are legal.”  Poison Pill Guides Fail to Quell Anxiety,
supra.
113. Jeannine Mitchell, The Year of the Poison Pill, IR MAG., Aug. 2005, http://www.irmag.com/
feature.asp?current=1&articleID=4290 (reporting that “two of Japan’s major oil wholesalers—Nippon Oil
and Cosmo Oil—have bought more shares in each other, as have major steel companies Kobe Steel, Nippon
Steel and Sumitomo Metal Industries”).
114. Dave Shellock & Steve Johnson, Yen Founders as Tokyo Stocks Rise, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005,
at 44.
115. See David Ibison, MUFG Bests Toyota’s Top Profit Performance, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005,
at 24; David Ibison, SMFG Reports Jump in Profits, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at 30; David Ibison,
Restructured Mizuho Raises Full-year Forecast, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at 34.
An even greater irony is that, without some intervention that makes
poison pills and other defenses easier to successfully adopt in Japan, several
factors seem to increase the likelihood that Japanese companies might return
to the practice of stable cross-shareholdings in order to protect themselves
from hostile takeovers.  Some activity to this end has already been reported,
particularly in the oil and steel industries.113  (Although this activity cannot be
specifically identified as a response to poison pill jurisprudence, and in fact
probably is not, it at least demonstrates that a return to cross-shareholding is
not unthinkable in Japan.)  In recalling that the main reason cross-
shareholdings unwound was the poor performance of the Japanese stock
market, one must now consider that Japanese equities are on the rise,
exemplified by the Nikkei 225 Average (a technology-weighted stock index)
closing above 15,000 for the first time in five years during 2005 and the
broader Topix index also reaching a five-year high.114  As a result, the
accounting rules that require companies to recognize their shareholdings on
a market value basis may be, at least for the time being, an incentive to
purchase equities rather than sell.  Furthermore, the Japanese banking
industry, which previously played a significant role in cross-shareholding
activity, is at its healthiest stage since the economic bubble and bad loan crisis
of the 1990s.  Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Mizuho, and
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG), the nation’s top three banks, all
reported dramatically improved profits and profit forecasts in 2005.115
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116. In fact, the Ministry Guidelines seem to allow cross-shareholdings to be used in conjunction with
poison pills by stating that “[i]f there are shareholders who already own more than the specific percentage
of stock [set as a trigger], such as 20%, at the time that takeover defense measures are introduced, excluding
such ownership from causing the defensive measure to be triggered does not constitute ‘differential
treatment among shareholders other than the acquiring person.’” See METI & MOJ, supra note 21, at 17.
117. Gilson, supra note 20, at 29.
This is not to say that poison pills and cross-shareholdings are strict
alternatives,116 but to the extent that limitations on poison pills and other
advance defensive measures encourage Japanese companies to return to their
cross-shareholding roots, the strictures that have been placed on the poison
pill may be viewed as harmful.  While Japan’s post-war economic success
makes it difficult to argue that cross-shareholdings are purely inhibitory of
growth, today’s environment of heightened global economic competition is
not one in which many companies can afford to tie up valuable liquid
resources simply for the sake of preventing takeovers.  If the judiciary’s limits
on the poison pill, the adoption of which does not immediately impact a
company’s capital structure or financial flexibility, lead to an upswing in
cross-shareholdings, then it can be said with some reassurance that the current
doctrine has failed to support Japan’s recent economic revival.  While poison
pills that are not effectively policed might be harmful to Japan’s needed
equilibration of assets,117 there is reason to believe that effective policing by
shareholders is possible.  On the other hand, cross-shareholding is almost
certainly harmful to the equilibration process, as it ties up capital that could
achieve greater returns elsewhere and, once it has risen to certain levels, may
entirely prohibit the market for corporate control.
CONCLUSION
Because of the preliminary nature of poison pills in Japan, few things are
entirely certain.  Nevertheless, it would appear that in its effort to promote a
shareholder-friendly standard to evaluate takeover defenses, the Japanese
judiciary has undercut the attractiveness of adopting poison pills for Japanese
companies because of the difficulty in overcoming shareholder challenges.
In attempting to apply characteristics of Delaware takeover jurisprudence from
an ex ante position, Japan has created a doctrine that seems inherently
weighted towards rejection of the pill.  Depending on whether the Diet passes
legislation to counteract this standard, the precedents set in Livedoor and
Nireco may or may not have lasting importance in Japan.  For the time being,
however, it is simply disappointing from an analytical perspective that
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Japanese companies are not being provided with greater discretion to adopt
poison pills.
This is not only because the pill can satisfy the void left by the dissipation
of cross-shareholdings, but also because it can never be said for certain
whether Japan’s infrastructure is developed enough to ameliorate the pill’s
potential abuses unless the pill is first given a broad opportunity to exist.  In
addition to the rise of shareholder activism, several other factors support the
idea that Japan’s infrastructure is indeed ready to support a pill that operates
to increase shareholder wealth:  directors now face a greater likelihood of
liability for breaching their duties to shareholders than ever before as a result
of an increased frequency of shareholder derivative litigation;118 the
compensation of Japanese managers with equity-based instruments has
recently grown and thus mitigates incentives for entrenchment upon receipt
of a profitable takeover bid;119 and the potential for proxy fights to counteract
directors’ decisions not to redeem a poison pill is enhanced by the fact that
staggered boards are not feasible under Japanese corporate law.120  Although
merely an anecdotal observation, it is perhaps even more important to consider
that “the American way of thinking—management for shareholders—is
becoming widely accepted by Japanese managers.  They are starting to try to
enhance cash flow to shareholders and maximize share prices.”121
If there is indeed legislative intervention to make poison pills and other
defensive measures easier to successfully adopt, it can only be hoped that it
does not go too far in making the poison pill an instrument of preclusion.
Since this would not be in the best interests of shareholders or the economy
as a whole, the Japanese judiciary should consider a reformulation of its
poison pill doctrine that will make it unnecessary for Japanese companies to
lobby for intervening legislation.  Specifically, consideration should be given
to retracting the current focal points that seem to require identification of a
specific cognizable threat and total relinquishment of the redemption decision
by the board before a pill can successfully be adopted.  Rather, in
consideration of the general coercive effects takeover bids can have on
shareholders, peacetime pills should be made feasible so long as reasonable
shareholder protections are in place.  Moreover, the province of directors as
the policymakers of a corporation should be respected regarding the decision
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122. Giving directors considerable, if not complete, authority over the redemption decision does not
necessarily harm shareholders because if the directors decide not to redeem a pill arbitrarily, they face the
strong prospect of being sued.  In a talk given by Professor Curtis Milhaupt of Columbia University in July
2005 that was moderated by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry, he commented that
“[w]hat is not well understood [in Japan] is that under Delaware law, even if a company has a pill in place
they must re-evaluate the fairness of the pill in place in the face of a bid.  That is often lost in the debate
in Japan . . . .”  Curtis Milhaupt, Is the Poison Pill Good for Japan?:  A Preliminary Analysis of the New
Takeover Guidelines (July 28, 2005), http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/05072801.html.  Based on the
current doctrinal direction, this fact may also be lost, or perhaps intentionally unconsidered, by the Japanese
courts.
123. Milhaupt, supra note 11, at 2183.
of whether to redeem.122  In the U.S. experience, the poison pill has not acted
as a preclusive defensive weapon but rather as a tool that improves the
negotiating position of a target company’s board and allows the company to
carry out its business without the constant fear of an abrupt and disruptive
takeover attempt.  Japan’s goal for the poison pill should be to achieve the
same result and, given the nation’s improved infrastructure for the policing of
corporate governance, this goal seems attainable.
Regardless of how the poison pill doctrine develops, there is little
question that Japanese companies will seek to defend themselves from
takeovers in some form.  A survey in early 2005 showed that managers of
seventy percent of large Japanese companies were concerned about the threat
of hostile takeovers,123 and in consideration of the implications of the Livedoor
and Nireco decisions, the percentage may have increased since.  As
demonstrated by the defensive activities of NBS upon Livedoor’s unsolicited
purchase of shares, Japanese companies can turn to a variety of measures
other than the poison pill to protect themselves.  Indeed, the modern
precedents for potential defenses involving crown jewels, increased dividends,
white knights, and “borrowed” equity have already been established, and this
Note points to the possibility of a reversion to cross-shareholdings in the
future as well.  Two general observations can be made about these alternative
defenses—none of them is necessarily more effective than the poison pill in
improving a target board’s negotiating position, and all of them have the
potential to be more economically disruptive than the adoption of the pill.  On
this basis alone, powerful motivations exist for the Japanese judiciary to
rethink its current doctrinal approach as further challenges to poison pills are
raised.
